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Abstract
This essay makes a unique case for the existence of justice, higher law and virtue by 
drawing on classic thinkers from both East and West.  It asserts that no better 
jurisprudential foundation can be found.  The need for this foundation emerges more 
clearly in the international context, but it applies to all legal systems.
After introducing the topic, explaining the relevance of this jurisprudence, responding to 
objections, and critiquing competing approaches, this essay presents pertinent sources 
from the East.  Well-regarded in the East but less known to the West, writers such as 
Mencius, Tao, Hsuntze, and the Neo Confucianists from Chu Hsi present indicators of 
this jurisprudential foundation.
Subsequently, this essay focuses on the Pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—
among the most important and influential thinkers in Western civilization.  Their 
contributions carry tremendous implications for a sound jurisprudence.
As the footnotes indicate, a broad-ranging interdisciplinary interplay takes place with 
literary, historical, philosophical, legal, and other sources.  This blend drinks deeply from 
profound wells of wisdom and insight.  It synthesizes contributions emerging from a 
diversity of cultures, time periods, disciplines, geographic venues, and other traits:  it 
rewards broad and open-minded engagement.
3This essay seeks to blaze a trail overgrown and obscured by the presently in-vogue 
approaches.  This confluence of great thinkers from East and West together provide 
weighty evidence that justice, higher law and virtue deserve to emerge from their eclipse 
over the past century to the present:  this essay seeks to make this case.  
Introduction
Notwithstanding current, postmodern1 wariness regarding universal, objective 
norms, an immutable and perennial jurisprudence of international law2 must hold true for 
all people everywhere.  If it is not for all people everywhere, how truly and rightfully 
"international" or "transnational" would it be?3
Stale legal thinking stuck in a relativistic and closed positivism4 lags behind the 
renewal of scholarship in philosophy and segments of the social sciences that 
increasingly recognize the realities of justice5, virtue6 and a higher standard, sometimes 
1
 See GENE EDWARD VEITH, POSTMODERN TIMES (1994), for a trenchant evaluation of postmodernism.  
Richard Rorty goes so far as to call this culture, sadly enough, "post-metaphysical" in RICHARD RORTY, 
CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY intro. and ch. 1 (1989). Rorty's term and work, taken descriptively, 
accurately takes the pulse of the culture, but does not provide the best prescription for the malady. 
2
 Anthony D’Amato, in a personal conversation at Northwestern University School of Law (Spring 2001).  
Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law Professor Anthony D'Amato asserted the idea that 
jurisprudence serves as the proper foundation of international law.  This foundation presently remains 
visible, but perhaps more subtly so in its applicability to law in general.
3
 The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, wrote prodigiously on higher law and justice vis a vis
international law See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND 
BOOTY (London, G. Cumberlege, 1950)(1604); HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
(trans. William Whewell, London, John W. Parker, 1853).
4 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed., New York, 1985) (1885); JOHN AUSTIN, 
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDCENCE DETERMINED (Cambridge, 1995); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND 
SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945); HANS 
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (trans. Max Knight, 1967) (1924). Kelsen and Austin are both deemed 
leading proponents of legal positivism; although not as easily recognized as such, Gray also qualifies as a 
type of legal positivist of a different mold from Kelsen and Austin.
5
 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, ch. 7, 12 (1980); chapter 7 of "Justice" of 
ANTHONY D'AMATO'S, ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 249-289 (1996), which devote themselves 
entirely to discussing justice.
4called higher law.7  The reputation of the legal profession and the quality of legal systems 
hinge on what sort of response issues forth:  whether the legal world joins in the renewal 
found in other disciplines, or whether it stays in stodgy ruts. 
Justice, higher law and virtue are the best foundation of any legal system and the 
practitioners thereof. Its need and desirability is only more pronounced when it comes to 
the international realm.  It is the search for the uniting, universal umbrellas built into the 
very fabric of the universe as well as the common ground of humanity across cultures.  
Put another way, this essay proposes the unifying theory of jurisprudence, which I 
contend provides the best basis for law and legal systems worldwide.  Anything less than 
this common denominator would prove itself unfit as the groundwork for international 
legal regimes, where cultures of member states can vary considerably.  
The current Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh writes: 
During the classical period of international law, the causal question of why nations 
obey was generally conflated with the normative question of why they should obey, 
which was in turn usually answered by 'semi-theological' reference to the 'higher 
law'—the 'law of nature,' of which international law was but a part.  Before the 
Roman empire, religion served as the paramount source of the law of nations.  In 
Roman law, Gaius defined jus gentium in terms of "law 'common to all men."  The 
Preface to Justinian's Institutes, published in 533 A.D., began with observations 
about the relationship between the law of nations and natural law.... Nor did 
medieval legal scholars distinguish municipal from international law, instead 
viewing the law of nations, understood as jus naturae et gentium, as a universal law 
binding upon all mankind.... The law of nations was thought to embrace private as 
well as public, domestic as well as transborder transactions, and to encompass not 
simply the "law of states," such as rules relating to passports and ambassadors, but 
also the law between states and individuals...international and domestic law together 
6
 See for example, Notre Dame Professor ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (Notre Dame, 1984); 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1988) which 
critiques the exclusion of virtue or Boston College Professor PETER KREEFT, BACK TO VIRTUE (San 
Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1992), which brings back classical understandings of virtue.
7 See EDWARD CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell 
University Press, 1928) (First printed as Harvard Law Review Article, Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher 
Law” Background of American Constitutional Law 62 HARV. L. REV. 149, (1928)).  
8
 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599. 2604-5.
5constituted a unified legal system, with domestic institutions acting as important 
interpreters and enforcers of international legal norms.8 (citations omitted). 
The pedigree of this perspective is extensive over millennia, and still today provides a 
foundation for international law especially, but also for law in general.  
The Nazi holocaust starkly demonstrates the need for an international 
jurisprudence of higher law, virtue and justice.  Atrocities were done "legally" at times 
under German law and at the command of German authorities.9 In order for one outside 
of German society, such as the Nuremberg court, to decry these murders and other 
abuses, there had to be some basis independent of the positive10 law of Germany.11 There 
seems to be no better grounding than higher law and justice.12
9The Hart-Fuller debate in the Harvard Law Review concerning the jurisprudential implications of the case 
of the grudge informer places the contrast between higher law and positivism in sharp relief.  The reference 
for H.L.A. Hart’s piece is 71 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 90, 616-20 (1958) while Lon F. Fuller’s reply 
appears in 71 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 630, 648-57 (1958).  See also, H.L.A. Hart 71 HARV. L. R. 90, 616-
20 (1958), Lon F. Fuller 71 HARV. L. R. 630, 648-57 (1958).  This case concerns a woman in Nazi 
Germany, pursuant to the Nazi Act of 1934, reporting insulting remarks about Hitler made by her husband 
as a pretext for getting rid of him.  The husband receives a death sentence commuted to a military 
assignment at the front.  Later, a West German court convicts her pursuant to the German Criminal Code of 
1871 for illegally depriving a person of his freedom.  Most notably, the court of appeal called the statute 
upon which the woman had used as her pretext “contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all 
decent human beings.”
10
 The Nazis used the positive pronouncements of Oliver Wendell Holmes ("Three generations of imbeciles 
are enough" Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)) to justify the neutering of the mentally handicapped in  
Germany.  Given Holmes' positivism as laid out in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457 (1897); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918), there exists few 
resources in his jurisprudence to criticize such eugenic practices.
11
 The Nuremberg Trials marked the first instance in history where international war crimes were tried in a 
court.  The Chief Prosecutor, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, explicitly grounds the 
prosecution on higher law. 
12 If there does not exist an objective, just basis from which to say the Holocaust was wrong, would it not 
be intensely problematic then to try the Germans on an ex post facto basis in an unprecedented, 
international tribunal? On what basis was there legitimate, actual notice that the Germans who legally 
obeyed orders from legitimate authorities to gas their victims were guilty of a crime if not that these 
Germans also have the higher law and a sense of justice through conscience within them? Conscience is a 
beacon of the higher law and justice, and every person has a conscience. Granted, conscience can become 
dulled, seared, tainted or skewed, but it does exist in every human being, a classic notion accepted by most 
of Western Civilization during the past two millennia.
6Cicero, for example, posited a higher law, virtue and justice position. Among 
many passages, Cicero wrote:
But if Justice is conformity to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same 
persons claim, everything is to be tested by the standard of utility, then anyone who 
thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he is able, disregard and violate the laws. It 
follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist in Nature, and if that form of it 
which is based on utility can be overthrown by that very utility itself. And if Nature is not 
to be considered the foundation of Justice, that will mean the destruction [of the virtues 
on which human society depends]. For where then will there be a place for generosity...13
Thus Cicero, widely hailed as the greatest legal mind of his time, directly 
repudiates legal positivism and selfish utilitarianism, and vouches for higher law, 
virtue and justice, the soundest basis for law, including international law.  
This essay does not attempt to delineate and demarcate all the contours of higher 
law, virtue and justice: such a task extends beyond the scope of this essay.  It merely 
seeks to establish the existence of higher law, virtue and justice so that those who had 
categorically excluded such notions (especially those who have done so without much 
thought) would at least have the opportunity to consider or reconsider these notions.
This jurisprudential view does not belong exclusively to any political party or 
government: it remains the common inheritance of all humans everywhere.  It refuses to 
wear the Emperor's new clothes14 particular to every age and place.  
Intentionally, I do not focus on applying the foundation herein to particular legal, 
political or social issues15 (except, at most, in passing or as a brief example) lest the 
reader's position in one direction or another obfuscate the desirability of this framework 
in general.  Also, a foundation does not form an entire edifice, and certain portions of the 
13 CICERO, LAWS §§ I, XV (New York, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). 
14
 A reference to the well-known Hans Christian Anderson story of an Emperor who is cleverly persuaded 
to wear undergarments with nothing else on top of them in public due to being persuaded that it is in vogue. 
15
 For such application to various issues and policies, see NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC 
POLICY (ed. David F. Forte, 1998).
7edifice would more directly touch on the foundation then others.  Similarly, one can 
similarly analyze where this jurisprudential foundation touches more directly or less 
directly on variegated aspects of the entire edifice of law.16  However, such analysis also 
largely lies outside the scope of this essay.        
Though higher law can be used as a pretext for assorted forms of mischief, its 
abuse should not lead to a denial of its existence.  Indeed, these ideas of virtue, justice 
and higher law themselves would seek to bring a corrective on such abuse.  This essay 
simply tries to point to the existence and helpfulness of higher law, virtue and justice 
employed correctly rather than abused, so that at least a few more glimmers may emerge 
from its relative eclipse in both modern and postmodern legal scholarship.17
Relevance
The most important and foundational relevance for this framework is that it 
proposes the unifying, universal foundation of jurisprudence, which itself is the proper 
foundation for law.  Such relevance comes out more strikingly in international law18, 
which cuts across national cultures.  To state it in a different way, not a single facet of 
law can live completely independent of justice, virtue, and higher law--and flourish in 
good health.19  The convocation of sources in this essay primarily seeks to establish the 
16
 For example, this paper would have more direct relevance to the common law idea of malum in se than 
malum prohibitum in criminal law.  Another example would be the differing notions of viciousness (as 
opposed to virtue) found in differing mens rea with their proportionately differing punishments in criminal 
law.  The relegation of this example to a footnote perhaps helps accentuate the point that how the specific 
applications of this jurisprudential foundation would fall to other writings besides this one.  
17 See Peter Kreeft, The Eclipse of Permanent Things, PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY (Fall 1991). 
18This relevance emerges time and again for this legal academic, who has taught courses such as Public 
International Law, International Organizations, and Human Rights. 
19
 For example, even a seemingly unrelated legal provision, such as stop signs at a crowded intersection, 
still has virtuous and just goals—as well as principles touching on higher law.  Trying to prevent injury or 
death to innocent human beings would be one; the benefits of order instead of chaos or anarchy constitutes 
another; fairness is implicated in that the first to arrive has right of way; recklessly rushing through a stop 
8existence of justice, virtue and higher law, which can serve as an efficacious filter and a 
perspicuous lens through which to interpret, analyze, synthesize and critique especially 
transnational and international law, but also positive law as a whole.  
The widespread convergence of this recognition from some of the most enduring 
thinkers from both the East and the West,20 which I trace below, gives tremendous 
credibility to the common reality and truths that they present.  Taken as a group, they do 
not speak from the same cultural, temporal and professional prejudices, biases, and 
patches of ignorance particular to any specific slice of society.21
If such truth is immutable, how recently these people acknowledged these realities 
is, in fact, irrelevant.  If anything, they help to assure us that they are not speaking from 
the same cultural, temporal and professional prejudices, biases, provincialities and 
patches of ignorance particular to any specific group, including 21st century legal 
scholars.22
The present legal academic world regularly celebrates some of the dimensions of 
justice, virtue and higher law, even if these ideals sometimes fall under different rubrics.  
After all, cases such as Brown v. Board of Education clearly did not follow the existing 
line of positive law or certain elements of then current, broader culture of its time, but is 
widely celebrated today as a paragon of justice and higher law--a case virtuously brought 
and decided.  A consistent positivist or formalist would strain to justify such a decision.  
sign without stopping and causing an accident would violate the virtue of prudence—to mention a few 
ways.  
20For examples, authors Mencius, Mo Tzu, Plato, Aristotle and others who will be discussed below.
21 It can broaden us beyond our particular time and place with its myopic focus on the recent, and provide 
needed correctives.  Chronological, geographical, ethnic or other types of snobbery or narrowness have no 
place in the Academy, jurisprudence, law, or anywhere else for that matter.  Therefore, what these classic 
Western and Eastern sources say should not receive summary dismissal by anyone.  See Oxford and 
Cambridge professor's work: C.S. Lewis Introduction to ATHANASIUS, DE INCARNATIONE (1945).  See also
C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN, which some consider the best book of the 20th Century on this topic.
22 See Id.
9The existence of transcultural truth and reality is relevant anywhere and everywhere and 
forms, where necessary, the basis for legal reform.23
Psychiatry and Law professor Dr. Alexander Obolsky talked about how he knew 
he was not having an auditory hallucination, which he momentarily though he was having 
when hearing what he thought was a Serbian band playing outside his office here in the 
United States.24 He did so by confirming it with a person of good hearing (and 
presumably at least, not suffering from auditory hallucinations herself) present with him 
at that time.  
Similarly, we find massive corroboration in these virtuoso thinkers and writers, 
presumably of sound (even outstanding) intellect and sense of justice themselves.  
Therefore, what these classic Western and Eastern sources say should not receive 
deprecation or lightly be ignored or dismissed by anyone.  Indeed, the more erudite that 
one is, the more likely that one would have a familiarity with such major thinkers. This 
essay mines from major veins, although in the case of the Eastern sources, they are little 
known or appreciated in the West.
Basic metaphysical questions not only are addressed by, but also arise from, an 
essay along these lines.25  However, a few that may be raised will be singled out for 
treatment hereinafter to clear some of the detritus that can obscure the view of justice, 
higher law and virtue, realities with which we must all reckon. 
23
 One need only look at whatever legal reform movement that one champions in order to realize that a 
relativistic positivism (law as it currently exists and finds enforcement by those with power) would 
foreclose the possibility of reform.  If one touts the notion of "progress", such progress must be based upon 
some standard (higher law and justice at its best) towards which a society is progressing.  To the extent a 
society violated justice, virtue and higher law, it would regress proportionately.
24
 Alexander Oblosky, Lecture in Law and Psychiatry at Northwestern University School of Law (Fall 
1999).
25 Questions of ontology, epistemology and ethics abound in this area and cannot possibly receive 
comprehensive treatment in a single essay of this length.
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 Relevant Objections and Other Challenges:
Epistemological Issues:
To begin with, the scientific method (including empirical methodologies) has 
proven a fruitful and useful modus operandi for many things.  It can be used 
productively, especially in the so-called natural sciences, but also in the so-called social 
sciences or humanities (including law) to a lesser extent.  Some of the greatest gifts that 
the Enlightenment and modernism have bequeathed upon us come from knowledge 
garnered through the sound and rigorous application of these methods.
However, an epistemology that limits itself to scientific (including empirical 
methodologies) alone necessarily impoverishes itself and proves impractical, unwittingly 
self-contradictory or both.  Let me expound briefly on each element of this assertion. 
As the philosopher of science Del Ratzch26, the leading philosopher Arthur F. 
Holmes27, as well as other contemporaries (and historical sources as well) point out, even 
so-called “neutral” applications of scientific methodologies necessarily predicate 
themselves on principles unproveable solely by scientific methodologies themselves.28
Otherwise, it becomes tautological, self-contradictory, or at best, begs the questions: why 
exalt scientific methodologies above all others?  Why exclude other methodologies and 
frameworks? 
26 DELVIN RATZSCH, SCIENCE & ITS LIMITS: THE NATURAL SCIENCES IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE (2000). 
27 See, e.g., ARTHUR HOLMES, ETHICS (1984).
28
 For example, assumptions of science unproveable by science include:  a) that the senses (sometimes with 
instrumental aid) can access reality; b) that the human mind can then inductively ascertain truths from what 
the senses apprehended; c) that there exist knowable truths about the reality of the physical world.  
11
  One may respond, because it works.  But then why are pragmatic, practical or 
utilitarian considerations deemed foundational by some?29  Furthermore, pragmatic or 
utilitarian30 considerations, rationales or justifications do not necessarily a priori exclude 
other methodologies and frameworks.  
Another may say, because it comports with reality and facts.  Herein lies a better 
response but one that also contains some untenable dichotomies.  Since knowledge 
(including the scientific kind) should accord with truth, which conforms to reality, 
scientific methods can provide valuable tools.  
However, they are not the only tools that can access objective reality.  As a matter 
of fact, just and virtuous realities are not best established by scientific methodologies.  
Just as scientific methodologies function through direct sensory or instrumental 
apprehension, the work of a healthy conscience,31 especially well-cultivated and 
developed, can directly apprehend just and virtuous realities comporting with higher law 
better than the best scanning electron microscope.  Excruciating torture of a child for no 
other reason than the sadism of the torturers is readily apprehended by all of even half-
decent conscience as being evil.32  It is possible, however, for a conscience to be clouded,
seared, calloused or twisted, just as different physical pathologies can hinder proper 
functioning of the body.  The acknowledgment of conscience, which can apprehend 
29 EDWARD S. CORWIN, supra note 7, 4-5. Note as well that these philosophies cannot justify themselves by 
themselves.  Otherwise, they are reduced to tautologies.  
30
 Whether of the variety advocated by Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 
1945); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing, 1979)(1863).
31 See J. BUDZISZEWSKI, THE REVENGE OF CONSCIENCE (1999).
32
 So this counterexample refutes utilitarian calculus: to put it another way, if you have a large enough 
crowd of sadists torturing an innocent child deriving massive amounts of pleasure that exceed the pain of 
the lone child, then it should be allowable under utilitarianism since the total pleasure outweighs the total 
pain.  That such an approach is morally reprehensible is readily apparent to those with even a half-
functioning conscience.  Thus, such actions are correctly deemed unconscionable—violative of justice, 
virtue and higher law.
12
justice, higher law, and virtue, should be no more impugned than the existence of 
mitochondria or DNA. 
The Basis for This Basis:
A healthy conscience is the standard by which one judges normal (in the moral 
sense).  That is why in Anglo-American criminal law, ignorance of the law is generally 
no excuse.  In other words, the conscience engraved into a person, regardless of whether 
the person never even heard of the handiwork of the legislatures, judiciaries or 
executives, should have prevented the crime from occurring.  There are various higher 
law theories, which are the main streams of the common-law tradition historically,33 that 
establish this point.34
Some would claim that justice is simply defined socially.  Such a stance 
undermines individual responsibility.35  For a physician at Ravensbruck or Auschwitz to 
refuse to perform crude experimentation on unwilling patients that severely injures and 
eventually kills the concentration camp prisoner would be to exercise virtue in 
accordance with justice and the higher law—a law higher than Nazi dictates, no matter 
33 See DR. ROBERT D. STACEY, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE AND THE COMMON LAW (1989).  In Anglo-
American history, Blackstone's writings constituted a standard part of legal education.  His works formerly 
graced the desks of law offices throughout the U.S. and England. 
34
 The present McCormick Chair at Princeton Robert George writes cogently from this school of thought in 
several works. See, e.g., ROBERT GEORGE, CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES (2001); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE 
OF NATURAL LAW (1999); ROBERT GEORGE, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL INQUIRY (1996).
35 For a physician at Ravensbruck or Auschwitz to refuse to perform crude experimentation on unwilling 
patients that severely injures and eventually kills the prisoner would be to exercise virtue in accordance 
with moral reality and the higher law—a law higher than Nazi dictates, no matter how legitimate the 
government or military source.
36 See for example the Nuremberg Code.
37
 Long-time Harvard University Professor Lawrence Kohlberg deems this level of moral development to 
be the highest of the six that he proposes. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODES OF 
MORAL THINKING AND CHOICE IN THE YEARS 10 TO 16 (1958); LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT : MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1st ed., 1981).
13
how legitimate or exalted the government or military source within German society. Nazi 
judges who refused to condemn innocent people in spite of formalistic or positivistic 
pressures36 (such as the Nuremberg Code) would be exercising virtue in accordance with 
justice and the higher law.37  If such virtue, justice and higher law did not exist, on what 
basis could one critique, redress, or reform atrocities done during the Holocaust, the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or East Timor—not to even start mentioning the Western 
Hemisphere?38
This view necessarily undermines various forms of determinism39 (biological, 
social, etc.), which seek to eliminate the existence of volition and responsibility.40  Such 
determinisms presumably attract their adherents by thus eradicating culpability, a 
convenient (but incorrect) way to deal with guilt and shame.  It should be noted that 
removing culpability negates responsibility, which pushes towards anarchy, anomie41 and 
antinomianism,42 conditions that adherence to virtue, justice and higher law prevents.
38 Other examples of international infamy along these lines include the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (for 
which the U.N. established special tribunals) East Timor (for which a separate country was recently 
formed) Colombia and Peru (which often have come under the judgment of both the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
39
 See the philosophy of science works of Oxford Professor Alister McGrath, who holds a Ph.D. in 
microbiology.
40 FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND (trans. Mirra Ginsburg, 1974).  Dostoevsky satirizes 
rationalistic, empirical determinism extensively--but to provide one sampling: ".... so that everything that is 
done by man isn't in the least a matter of his own will, but happens of itself.... then man will no longer be 
answerable for his actions, and life will become exceedingly easy.  All human actions will, of course, be 
classified according to these laws—mathematically, like a logarithm table, up to 108,000—and entered in a 
special almanac.  Or, still better, certain edifying volumes will be published, similar to our encyclopedic 
dictionaries, in which everything will be calculated and designated with such precision that there will no 
longer be any actions or adventures in the world."
41
 The term is used particularly in the sociological sense as employed by scholars such as Emile Durkheim.
42
 A term indicating lawlessness—not a condition favorable to the existence of legal systems, institutions or 
legal professionals to say the least.
14
A common (but irresponsible) escape attempt is an agnostic skepticism, which is 
a position in and of itself.  If seeking logical consistency, why not be skeptical and/or 
agnostic about skepticism and agnosticism themselves?43
Another error lies in embracing contradictory, relativistic pluralism.44  While 
recognizing the common ground often existent between various worldviews, it plainly 
violates the law of non-contradiction if it holds to mutually exclusive claims. An 
objective standard of justice exists; an objective standard of justice does not exist: both 
statements cannot be true and concomitantly comport with reality. 
This does not impugn true paradoxes or antinomies, which only seem to 
contradict, but do not in actuality.45 Rather, I am talking about clear-cut A and not A
instances that cannot both be true according to this basic axiom of logic, philosophy and 
mathematics—which also correspond with reality.  To give another example, a person 
does not both have biological children and not have biological children at the same time 
in any unified, literal sense.  To say otherwise would fly in the face of common sense.  
So as the leading Hindu philosopher Ramakrishna even acknowledged, 
epistemological arms that embrace all views lead to self-strangulation.46  The open mind, 
43
 No one could function with a thoroughgoing skepticism or agnosticism.  If I did not firmly believe in the 
existence of this computer on which I am typing this essay or this Law Review member who (presumably) 
will read it, I would not be typing it right now.  If I did not believe in the existence of the chair I am sitting 
on, I would not attempt to sit on it for the many hours I have in preparing this paper.  So even functionally, 
thoroughgoing skepticism and agnosticism fail.  So I am skeptical of the soundness of skepticism and not
agnostic about existing pitfalls in agnosticism.  Most honest and sensible people could not correctly claim 
to hold a thoroughgoing skepticism or agnosticism:  those who do, paralyze themselves.
44 See the works of the British author Lesslie Newbigin, which provide a sound treatment of pluralism.  For 
example, see LESSLIE NEWBIGIN, TRUTH TO TELL (1991).
45 For example, I do not presently deny such paradoxes as the wave/particle duality of light, or the way 
certain sub-atomic particles seem to behave, or elements of both genders existing in hermaphrodites, the 
Trinity, or all three states (water vapor, liquid water and solid ice) of H20 existing at the triple point.  
46 As the leading Hindu philosopher Ramakrishna even acknowledged.  See, e.g., RAMAKRISHNA, 
BHABANAYA YUGAPURUSHA KESABACANDRA O BHABE SRISRIRAMAKRSHNA (1980); RAMAKRISHNA, 
BHAKTIPRASANGA (1962); RAMAKRISHNA, GITATATTVE SRIRAMAKRSHNA (1969). 
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like the open mouth, said G.K. Chesterton, is intended to close down upon something.47
That something includes the truths of justice, virtue and higher law that accord with the 
highest design of human nature.48  This position does not contradict the law of non-
contradiction.  It is cohesive and comports with objective reality.
Lesser Alternatives 
It was recognized historically that the common law permits for corrections of 
errors.49  Formalistic or positivistic cowardice should not prevent those with authority to 
modify positive law from abandoning unjust ruts.50  Thus, we should not believe that 
human lawmakers or adjudicators or executors are so constrained to maintain unjust 
laws--unless (s)he is binding her(him)self with formalist/positivistic shackles.51
Rabelais satirizes the formalist in Gargantua & Pantagruel.52  The judge has an 
elaborate array of formalities and procedures—but in the end decides to make the 
47
 This epigram comes from the British author G.K. Chesterton. See, e.g., G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL IS GRIST: 
A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1931); G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (1913); G.K. CHESTERTON, AS I 
WAS SAYING (1966). 
48
 See for example the American Declaration of Human Rights, (Feb. 15th, 2005) at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention, which bases its pronouncements on this premise.
49 See JEFFREY BRAUCH, IS COMMON LAW HIGHER LAW? (1999).
50 See ANTHONY D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE (1984).
51
 The doctrine of stare decisis or custom should not be exalted over justice.  The common law does not 
advocate such a stance and international law should not embrace it. Yet such a stance is not rare de facto.  
Instead, virtue, justice and higher law should reign above slavish devotion to stare decisis or custom.  For a 
contemporary example, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991), which states: "Stare decisis is 
not an inexorable command; rather it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to 
the latest decision" (citation omitted).  See also Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional 
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 87 (2001), which connects stare decisis with positivism: "The American 
commitment to stare decisis gradually strengthened during the nineteenth century, due mainly to the 
emergence of reliable law reports and a positivist conception of law." and a contrasting quote of Lord 
Mansfield contra Blackstone in Id. at 71:  "[P]recedent, though it be Evidence of law, is not Law itself, 
much less the whole of the Law."  Eschewing an overly rigid application of stare decisis allows the 
overturning of cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
52 RABELAIS, GARGANTUA & PANTAGRUEL 440-441 (trans. Jacque Le Clerq, New York, Random House, 
1963). “First I view and review, read and re-read, ponder, weigh, thumb and digest the bills of complaint, 
subpoenas, appearances by proxy, reports of hearings, investigations, instruments of deposition, petitions, 
articles of evidence, allegations, rejoinders, rebuttals, requests, inquests, surrejoinders, surrebuttals, 
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decision randomly.  This satire implies that procedural integrity is not sufficient to ensure 
substantive justice.  Substantive justice, as the dominant goal, should rather be served by 
fair procedures.53
The fictional Justice Keen is a prototypical positivist.54 He adopts a false 
dichotomy that is often drawn between facts and values.55  According to this position, 
facts are public and objective while values are only private and presumably subjective.56
If higher law and justice do in fact exist, why should they find themselves relegated to 
private life alone?57  Such a view leads to hypocrisy, undermining the integrity of the 
unitary, whole person in society.58
So the question stares us in the face, does international law (and other law) have 
its basis in higher law and justice?  Or is it nothing more than a product of the politics of 
professionals, politicians, diplomats and other power brokers (which may or may not 
have a firm, objective basis), who alone have sovereignty to decide the norms and 
structures?59
confirmation of former testimony, acts, writs, bulls, exceptions taken, grievances, objections, counter-
objections . . . I decided in favor of the party who won at the judiciary, tribonian and praetorial throw of the 
dice.” 
53
 Attorneys and judges sometimes look for procedural pretexts to advance substantive concerns. 
54Harvard Law Professor Lon Fuller’s Lon Fuller, Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 
616 (1949), makes each of the fictional judges prototypical of a school of jurisprudential thought.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Newbigin, supra note 47.
58 See passim in the book VIRTUE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER (eds. Robert C. 
Roberts & Robert B. Kruschwitz 1987) for excellent contributions on this point.  It impoverishes public life 
and leads to the double lives of those who put on the façade of a public persona that masks an execrable 
life outside the public eye.  Those in the legal/political realm cannot excuse themselves from this in saying 
that though they consider something an injustice as a "private citizen", we must mechanically maintain the 
present law in their public capacities when it is manifestly unjust albeit politically inexpedient for their own 
self-interested considerations.  While failure is common, it should not deny the goal of a virtuously 
integrated person, virtuous (including just) and moral in private as well as public life.  Legislators, legal 
practitioners, judges and other professionals often have public dimensions to their lives that should be no 
less moral or virtuous than their private lives.  This applies to the domestic realms, international spheres, as 
well as the interactions between the domestic and international systems.
17
For if there exists no justice or higher law, every reform, every critique would fall 
into the morass of merely subjective opinion.  If all that exists is each person’s subjective 
opinion, then there do not exist grounds from which one could say that one opinion is 
better than another.  If not, then what permanent foundation would law then stand or 
should it progress towards?  Remove the cleansing cascade of higher law, virtue and 
justice, then a raw, cynical calculus of so-called Realpolitik would remain like a crusted 
stain. 
If objective bases in higher law and justice do not exist, then ideological and 
Weltanschauung60 chaos, conflict and confusion follow.  Epistemic despondence and 
narrowness then tend to rear their ugly heads.  Rather than having no better grounds than 
the instability of relativism and/or uneasy but logically incompatible pluralism, many 
authors61 aver a justice, virtue and higher law foundation for the super-structures of law.  
This convergence and confluence of great scholars, which will be treated below, bears 
witness that virtue, justice and higher law do in fact exist, independently of the vagaries 
of any mortal individual or group.62  They serve as the best basis for law, especially 
international law.  
When this reality is ignored and oppressive laws are allowed to reign, the results 
can be nothing short of catastrophic.  Nazi Germany, Maoist China, and Stalinist Russia 
are but three 20th-century examples of totalitarian regimes that abused law as a weapon 
60 See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS (trans. Wayne Rebhorn, New York, Barnes and 
Noble Classics, 2003); Alexander Obolsky, Law & Psychiatry Lecture at Northwestern University School 
of Law (Fall 1999).
61
 The German term for worldview
62
 Various passages in Sophocle's Antigone, see SOPHOCLES, THE OEDIPUS PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES, (trans. 
Paul Roche, Mentor, 1958) [hereinafter OEDIPUS PLAYS], bring this point out lyrically. 
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for oppression and repression.63  Mass executions, gulags, cruel human experimentation, 
and concentration camps resulted.64
As a positive contrast, and by way of contemporary introduction and treatment, it 
is fitting to include one shining example of courageous communication of these 
unpopular yet no less just realities: Nobel Laureate Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn.  
Few (if any) people in the 20th century had more effectively borne eloquent witness to 
higher law, virtue and justice in reference to such horrendous regimes, especially the 
brutal oppression that Solzhenitsyn himself suffered.  His writings and addresses give 
hope that the truth of sound virtue, justice and higher law can and will triumph over 
miswielded force.65  In this way, Solzhenitsyn addresses the larger questions of law with 
its best metaphysical moorings.  For these attainments, he has been heralded widely as a 
great voice in an ethical and legal wilderness. 
These questions are often ignored to our peril.  The accumulated experience and 
wise interpretation of history make it not too sweeping a statement to claim that all 
people in all places and times (contrary to socialized or other ethical relativisms) must 
heed justice, higher law and virtue in order to thrive, whether in domestic or in 
international spheres.
63RANDALL L. BYTWERK, BENDING SPINES : THE PROPAGANDAS OF NAZI GERMANY AND THE GERMAN 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (2004); RHOADS MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF ASIA 351-4, 379-382 (1992); Georgii 
Fedorovich, Trudy I. V. Stalina o iazykoznanii i voprosy istoricheskogo materializma (1951). 
64
 While this response does not purport to provide a historical survey of the practices of such regimes, even 
a cursory scan would reveal that many such historical treatments have well-documented the inhumane and 
barbarous acts done in the name of (or at least with the permission of) law, including improper application 
or enforcement of decent laws that were violated.  The primary documents in the Nuremberg trials are a 
case in point.
65
 As a singular contrast in the midst of the Soviet oppression, Nobel Laureate Aleksandr Isayevich 
Solzhenitsyn powerfully conveys the ideals of higher law.  From his bombshell Commencement Address at 
Harvard University in 1978 to the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, from the Gulag Archipelago to 
The Calf and the Oak, Solzhenitsyn stunningly asseverates higher law. See, e.g., ALEKSANDR ISAYEVICH 
SOLZHENITSN, THE CALF AND THE OAK (1980); ALEKSANDR ISAYEVICH SOLZHENITSN, GULAG 
ARCHIPELAGO (1st ed., New York, 1985); Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsn, Address at Harvard University 
(1978).
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As we acknowledge such ethical virtuosos as Solzhenitsyn in our time, we can 
also remove ourselves from chronological snobbery and geographic provincialism in 
order to stand on the broad shoulders of giants from both East and West such as Mencius, 
Mo Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, and others to see further and more clearly than the constraints of 
ethical relativism or legal positivism/formalism would allow.66  A truly international 
jurisprudence should be founded on that which is common to East and West for all time.  
The fixation with the recent and contemporary must make room for the wisdom of the 
ages, which does not change over the shifting sands of time.67
Helping to dig a truly transnational and international jurisprudential foundation 
towards a more widespread recognition of the existence of objective justice, higher law 
and virtue is an important foundation to consider before asking questions about any 
particular legal system, international or domestic alike.   These first sections have 
introduced this topic, demonstrated its relevance, and addressed objections that exist to 
higher law, virtue and justice as a jurisprudential basis.  This treatment now extends a 
constructive case with a view from the East as well as classical sources from the West.
A View From the East
Classical Eastern philosophers, often ignored or given scant treatment in the 
West, have much to teach us about the necessity of adhering to justice and higher law in 
order for law and the polis to flourish, domestically or internationally.  They write much 
66
 To borrow and modify a modest disclaimer by Sir Isaac Newton: "If I have seen further, it is because I 
have stood on the shoulders of giants."
67
 If international law (and other law) do not more fully regain their moorings in just reality, virtue and 
higher law, then we will reap much bitter fruit in the future of the world.  Much positive law begging for 
conscientious objections may then increase.
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of virtue, which merges with broader notions of justice—indeed justice itself is a classic, 
linchpin virtue.  Virtue also always comports with the higher law.  Let us delve into 
relevant portions of their jurisprudence in order to regain for ourselves a more adequate 
adherence to virtue, justice and higher law in law, most notably for transnational or 
international law. 
Around 1122 BC, the Chou Empire conquered the Shang people.  Instructions 
issued by a Chou ruler to one of his vassals said: “I will explain to you how virtue should 
control the use of punishments . . . Make your judgments justly and sincerely.”68  Even a 
ruler of these marauding conquerors not only referred to, but also exhorted, the exercise 
of just judgments.  Such just judgments surely rise above the arbitrary and capricious, the 
inconsistent and unfair.  Justice grounded in the higher law is a prized virtue.  
Mo Tzu, who was primarily raised on Confucianism, started his own school of 
thought, which was comparable to classical Confucianism.  He said the following about 
the need for just administration of law and order for thriving, applicable to both the 
international and domestic arenas:  
Nowadays all rulers wish their domains to be wealthy, their people to be numerous, and 
their administration to produce order.  But in fact they obtain not wealth but poverty, not 
populousness but paucity of population, not order but chaos—thus they lose what they 
want and get what they abhor.  What is the reason?
Mo Tzu said: It is because the rulers are unable to exalt the virtuous and to cause the 
capable to administer their governments.  When virtuous officers are numerous in a state, 
it is well governed; when they are few, it is governed badly.  Therefore it is the business 
of the rulers merely to cause the virtuous to be numerous.  By what method can this be 
done?
Mo Tzu said: Suppose, for example, that one wishes to cause good archers and 
charioteers to be numerous.  In this case one will certainly enrich them, give them rank, 
respect them, and laud them.  Once these things are done, good archers and charioteers 
will become numerous.  How much more should this be done in the case of the virtuous 
and excellent who are rich in virtuous conduct, versed in argumentation, and experienced 
in the arts of the Way.  These are certainly the treasures of the nation and the supports of 
68 THE SHE KING 396-7 (James Legge trans., London, 1875).
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the state.  They too must be enriched, given rank, respected, and lauded; once this is 
done, they too will be numerous.69
The passage quoted above outlines both the wisdom and method of instilling virtue (of 
which justice is a central one) and installing virtuous leaders.70 Both results bring greater 
justice to a society and encourages greater adherence to higher law.  Such objectives rise 
higher than a behaviorism71 unattached to magnanimous ends, such as advancing the 
common good.  
Mo Tzu apparently agreed with Confucius that the hereditary rulers should 
transfer the administration of their governments to men of virtue and capacity.72  At its 
best, it should not reduce into a purely pragmatic, behaviorist or utilitarian calculus—
although it can appear that way on its face and in its crasser forms, can reduce to such 
calculi.
Mencius:
In the midst of a high-water mark for the popularity of Mo Tzu’s way of thinking, 
the so-called “agricultural school” of Mencius emerged.73  It maintained that “a wise and 
virtuous ruler tills the soil together with his people in order to get his food; along with 
governing, he cooks his own meals morning and night.”74 This notion has the principle 
69 MOTSE, THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL WORKS OF MOTSE 30-31 (Mei Yi-Pao trans., 1929).
70 See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., Somoza's Revenge: A New Judge for the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL, No. 4, 137 (April 1992), on the debate surrounding the moral 
qualification for a justice on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
71 See B.F. SKINNER, CONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT; A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1969); IVAN PAVLOV, 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1957). 
72 MOTSE supra note 68.
73
 Mencius’ opinion foreshadows and antedates by millennia the views of this nation's founders such as 
Washington (who tilled the soil himself at Mount Vernon) and Jefferson (who had greater trust in the hard-
working, ordinary agrarian than some of his oligarchic contemporaries had).  
74 THE FOUR BOOKS, 3 (2) 10 (trans. James Legge, China, Commercial Press, date unknown).
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behind it that those who rule and judge should know the life of the people they rule 
and/or judge.  
Apparently, Mencius followed the example of Confucius in a number of ways.75
To the point at hand, Mencius also eloquently asserted the claim of the scholar and the 
man of virtue to a place of honor above that which is conferred by the pomp of princes.  
Such a man, expresses Mencius, should regard worldly success and failure with 
indifference, secure in the knowledge that, if his character is as it should be and the world 
fails to acclaim him, the fault lies not with himself but with the world.76  That is the sort 
of virtue that is worthy of notice, and refreshing in an age of hype and celebrity 
production.  Describing the just and virtuously great person, Mencius says: 
Dwelling in the wide house of the world, occupying his correct place in the world, 
walking in the great way of the world; when his desire for office is fulfilled, practicing 
his principles along with others; when that desire is disappointed, practicing them alone; 
riches and honors cannot corrupt him, poverty and mean condition cannot change him, 
authority and power cannot make him bend the knee: such is the truly great man.77
Earlier, Confucius had told the rulers that they should transfer the administration of their 
governments to men of virtue, ability, and education,78 which Mencius fully concurs 
with--as the previous quote partially describes. 
“One who outrages the human virtues is called a brigand; one who transgresses 
against righteousness is called a ruffian.  I have heard that the fellow called Chou was put 
to death, but I have not heard that this was killing a sovereign.”79 said Mencius in regards 
75
 For example, he was quite as democratic as Confucius in accepting students regardless of their 
socioeconomic or political standing, demonstrating an unusually egalitarian educational ethic THE FOUR 
BOOKS supra note 73.
76 Id. at (1) 9.
77 Id. at 3 (2) 2.3.  As we shall see later in this study, similar notions also occurred in prominent western 
thinkers.  We need many more such great and just people, who not only reflect higher law in their 
jurisprudence, but their very lives.  
78 See CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS (trans. David Hinton, Washington D.C., Counterpoint, 1998); CONFUCIUS, 
ANALECTS (trans. Raymond Dawson, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).
79 Id at 1 (2) 8.
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to the regicide of the last Shang ruler when asked about it by the king of Ch’i.  Evidently 
then, Mencius placed just and virtuous character above brute power or position, even the 
position of king. For Mencius, might does not equal right, nor does positional authority 
by itself necessarily denote the exercise of justice.  Hence, the basic postulate of 
Mencius’ sociopolitical and legal program asserted that virtues such as justice, above all 
else, breed success in the most profound sense of the word.80
Mencius directly counters a representation on its face of one of Mo Tzu’s 
principal arguments, viz. the necessity of something’s utility or profitableness as bedrock.  
It could also be said to counter Western utilitarians such as John Stuart Mill81 and Jeremy 
Bentham,82 who rehash some of the same hackneyed utilitarianism much later in another 
part of the world.  
The following passage also emphasizes the necessity to go beyond the narrowness 
of short-term, shortsighted personal utility and profitability.  The book of Mencius
begins:
Mencius had an interview with King Hui of Liang.  The king said: 'Venerable sir, since you 
have considered it worth while to journey so far to come here, I assume that you must have 
brought with you counsels to profit my kingdom—is it not so?’  Mencius replied, ‘Why must 
your majesty speak of profit?  I have nothing to offer but benevolence and righteousness.  If 
your majesty asks, ‘What will profit my kingdom?’ then the great officers will ask, ‘What 
will profit our families?’ and the lower officers and the people will ask, ‘What will profit our 
persons?’  Superiors and inferiors will contend with one another for profit, and the state will 
be endangered.83
Clearly, a simplistic profit- seeking and utilitarian perspective fails to reach that just and 
virtuous height that Mencius advocates.  Those who advance justice and higher law 
80
 The point here is not an advocacy of regicide or other killing of a judge or sovereign—by no means.  It is 
again, dramatically underscoring the importance of justice and virtue in any legal and political system. 
80 JOHN STUART MILL supra note 30.
81 JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 30.
82 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 73.
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typically do not obsess about profit—and can indeed sacrifice in various ways for higher 
causes.84
Continuing this argument, Mencius points out that such a condition will put the 
king in the precarious position of losing his very life to a subordinate who covets his 
position and his wealth.  “But,” he continues, “there has never been a benevolent man 
who neglected his parents, nor a righteous man who regarded his ruler lightly.  Let your 
majesty then speak only of benevolence and righteousness.  Why must you speak of 
profit?”85  Such a stance undermines reductionistic “bottom line” pursuits of profit to the 
exclusion of virtue, an approach unworthy of the more exalted calling of justice and 
higher law.
As Confucius and Aristotle contended, Mencius claimed that the good is that 
which is most fully congruent with human nature.86  However, the Legalists of China 
would contend that Mencius had an unduly optimistic view of human nature.87  All of 
them however, agreed upon the necessity of actions in accordance with sound justice and 
other virtues, the necessity of higher law beyond brute force or sheer authority alone. 
To return to Mencius, he vouched for “education” chiefly as a means to cultivate 
a good sense of justice in accordance with original human nature.88  He observes, “That 
84
 For example, surveys have demonstrated that public interest attorneys at once both make the least income 
yet have the highest satisfaction in their work of any segment of the legal profession.  They often make 
greater impacts for justice too.
85 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 73.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88Perhaps similar to Platonic "memory" or analogous to a pre-Fall state of Edenic innocence in the Judeo-
Christian view see Genesis 1-3. 
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which differentiates men from the birds and beasts is very slight; ordinary men discard it, 
superior men preserve it.”89
Tao:
Moving from Mencius to the Taoists, it is a basic principle of Taoism that one 
should be in harmony with, not in rebellion against, the foundational laws of the 
universe.90  Such a tenet presupposes the existence of foundational laws of the universe, 
in other words, higher law.91
Living in accordance to the fundamental laws of the universe includes the 
conclusion for contemplative Taoism that one should maintain insouciance towards 
power, position, or honors in this world.92  Taoist works speak of various sages who 
declined the offices of prime ministers and even did not seize the offer of thrones.93
Thus, a Taoist living according to these ideals would live above the vainglory, conceit 
and arrogance that often accompany rulership in this life.  
The Taoist position is much more susceptible to the critique of erring too far 
towards a phlegmatic, even at times irresponsible indifference to such matters.  It also 
fails to provide a sufficient notion of stewardship, for example, of resources in its flight 
away from materialism.  It almost crowns apathy as a virtue—if taken too far.  It would 
be no virtue to be apathetic or phlegmatic to violations of international human rights, for 
89 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 73 at 14 (2) 19.1.  Mencius’ position implicitly endorses the proposition 
that one must always act justly and virtuously because everything one does will impact, for good or ill, the 
development of one’s own character.  That statement would necessarily include everything that one does 
within the legal profession.
90 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 73 at 14 (2) 19.1.
91 U.S. legal scholars in the present period of history certainly do not hold such an assumption universally, 
which accentuates the need for its rediscovery.
92 Id.
93 Id. 
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example, which call for upholding worldwide.  Nonetheless, it still adheres to a form of 
the higher law.
Hsuntze:
The philosopher Hsuntze also notes the self-interested proclivities of humans that 
Taoism apparently attempts to remedy.94  Hsuntze’s views contrast the Taoists in what he 
considers “natural” in that a Taoist considers becoming “natural” as the crux of the 
answer whereas Hsuntze sees our “natural” condition as problematic from birth.95  He 
says: 
Men are born with the love of gain; if this natural tendency is followed they are 
contentious and greedy, utterly lacking in courtesy and consideration for others.  They are 
filled from birth with envy and hatred for others . . .
For this reason it is essential that men be transformed by teachers and laws . . . 
But everything that can be learned and worked for is acquired character.96
This view not only serves as a counter-point to the views of Mencius, but it also 
impinges upon what some thinkers consider the motivating forces (e.g., a la Adam 
Smith97 and other capitalists) and/or problems with capitalistic systems (e.g., Karl Marx 
and Mao Tse-Tung).  These systems, Hsuntze would likely say, beg for virtues of 
temperance, justice and content generosity through the fostering of character education 
and laws consonant with the higher law.  Legal systems ideally work as safeguards 
against these self-interested tendencies of humanity.  
94 XUNZI, THE WORKS OF HSUNTZE (Homer H. Dubs, trans, 1928).
95 Id.
96 Id. 
97 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 10 (ed. C.J. Bullock, P.F. Collier & Son, 1909).
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To give another example, an extended but selective quote from Hsuntze 
elaborates on key elements of his vision of justice, especially in regard to virtuous 
contentment (not to be confused with a smug complacence) contrasted with disgruntled 
greed.  The level of justice, virtue and accordance with higher law would increase with its 
application.  It contrasts moral laxness versus morality, materialism versus satisfaction, 
anxiety vs. peace, and anhedonia vs. virtuous pleasure and happiness.  It would accord 
well with Aristotle's notions of arete and eudaimonia (virtue and happiness).   
Those who regard moral principles lightly always attach great importance to material 
things.  And those who externally attach great importance to material things are always 
inwardly anxious.  Those who act without regard for moral principles are always 
externally in a dangerous position.  And such persons are always inwardly afraid.
When the heart is anxious and afraid the mouth may hold fine food, but it will not taste it; 
the ears may hear bells and drums, but they will not hear music . . . one may wear the 
most comfortable clothing . . . but his body will be oblivious of them.  Even if all the 
pleasant things in the world were offered to one in this state, he could not be content.  If 
someone were to ask him what he wanted, and give him everything he asked for, he 
would still be dissatisfied.  And so, when every pleasant thing has been given him, 
sorrow is still abundant; and when all beneficial things have been added to them, harm is 
still plentiful . . . .
. . . . 
. . . Such persons, though they be…called rulers, are no different from common thieves.  
They may ride in carriages and wear caps of ceremony, but they are no better off than 
paupers.  This is what is called making one’s self a servant of material things.
When a man’s mind is peaceful and happy, then even sights below the ordinary will 
satisfy the eye; even sounds below the ordinary will content the ear; coarse rice, 
vegetables, and soup will be enough for the mouth; clothing of coarse cloth and sandals 
made from rough cords will give comfort to the body; a hut of straw, with a mat on the 
floor and a battered stool to lean against, will suffice for the form.
Such a man, lacking all the fine things in the world, is yet happy; though he has neither 
power nor position, his name becomes known.  If he were appointed to rule the empire, 
this would mean much for the empire, but it would make little difference in his peace of 
mind and contentment.  This may indeed be…making material things one’s servants.98
Such a passage can serve a salubrious purpose if more faithfully applied by those 
responsible for legal systems.  Indeed, Hsuntze's description can also be a virtuous 
98J.J.L. DUYVENDAK, HSUN-TZU ON THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES 252-3 (trans. T’oung Pao 
XXIII, Leiden, 1924).
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prescription that falls within higher law and justice for societies and individuals 
everywhere.
Neo-Confucianists From Chu Hsi:
We now move to one of the greatest if not the greatest of the Neo-Confucianists, 
Chu Hsi, whose interpretations of some of the classics were considered authoritative on 
the official government exams for almost 6 centuries from 1313 to 1905 (when the exams 
were abrogated in China).  Speaking on the issue of the structure of justice and higher 
law built into the universe, he avers that “Principles or li are without birth and 
indestructible.”99  Changeless, they are all part of the one great li, the Supreme Ultimate, 
which Chu Hsi equates at times with the Tao.  Thus, Chu Hsi recognized justice and 
higher law, both equally applicable in the Western Hemisphere as they have been in the 
East.  
Referring back to Mencius, another leading Neo-Confucianist Tai Chen states:  
“Those who anciently wished to exemplify illustrious virtue to the whole world, first 
ordered their own states . . . they first cultivated their own characters.  Wishing to 
cultivate their characters, they first rectified their hearts.”100 Chen helped revive the 
centrality of character development through virtue, a result that flows into and out of 
justice and the higher law.        
Chen reinforces these notions by recognizing the place of “virtues as the sense of 
shame, humility, and the knowledge of right and wrong.”101 Chen combines both 
emotivist and intellectual/cognitive dimensions in his conception of virtue.  Chen was not 
99 CHU HSI, SSU SHU CHI CHI CHU, TA HSUEH 5a (ed. Ssu Pu Pei Yao, 1905).
100 THE GREAT LEARNING 357-58 (Shanghai, China, The Chinese Books Company, 1933).
TAI CHEN, MENTZU I SU CHENG 2.7b-11a (1924).
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a moral skeptic, who is often mired in the morass of doubt and despair in regards to the 
epistemology of ethics.  
Perhaps his witnessing actual failures of justice, higher law and virtue helps 
explain why Yen Fu (1854-1921), who studied at the University of Edinburgh and 
translated Western philosophical works into Chinese, brought this scathing indictment 
after the first World War:  “It seems to me that in three centuries of progress the people 
of the West have achieved four principles: to be selfish, to kill others, to have little 
integrity and to feel little shame.”102 Coming from one who had formerly admired 
Western culture, Yen Fu’s words are sobering ones indeed.  The four "principles" Fu 
describes would not lead to a harmonious international or domestic legal system, to say 
the least.  
This survey identifies an Eastern pattern that recognizes the existence, and points 
to aspects of justice, higher law and virtue—whether indicated in "right living", Li, 
morality, Tao, or other comparable terms.  This reality, whichever appellation one 
chooses to give it, forms the best foundation for law, especially international law, which 
must carve out the common inheritance of humanity in the midst of diverse cultures.  
The Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle on Justice, Higher Law  and Virtue
Turning now from Asia to classical Greece, let us inquire into the Pre-Socratic, 
the Platonic, and then the Aristotelian conceptions of justice, higher law, and virtue, 
which are necessary to maintain the health of jurisprudence and the law that flows from, 
and is applied by, legal bodies and systems.
102 HSUEH HENG, NO. 18 6-7 (1923).
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Pre-Socratics
An emphasis of the Pre-Socratics that stresses their continuity with the past is the 
idea of a law-governed universe.103  Their explanations of the ordered processes of nature 
relate to the growing ethical conviction, entrenched in their cultural heritage, that just 
principles are rooted in reality.104  This emphasis has no part in the presumption that 
nature is value-free.105  Modern meta-ethics, by contrast, puts on a façade of just 
discourse while denying the very existence of a higher law.  
To give an example from Pre-Socratic literature, Orestes, in Aeschylus’s 
Oresteia, comes to the awareness of a more rational justice than cruel vindictiveness, a 
rule of law that seeks to harmonize rather than further inflame conflicting interests.  In 
this conception, the rule of reason overcomes blind fate; “a ‘court set up in perpetuity’ in 
the heavens”106 ultimately assures such justice.  This movement towards a more virtuous 
conception of higher law and an eternal, celestial Court gives hope for eventual justice in 
spite of present injustices.
Sophocles puts these words in heroine Antigone’s mouth that appeal to a higher 
law than the king’s orders.  These words respond to the question of whether she flatly 
chose to disobey.  She exclaims: 
   Naturally! Since Zeus never promulgated
   Such a law.  Nor will you find
   That Justice publishes such laws to man below.
   I never thought your edicts had such force
   They nullified the laws of heaven, which,
103 See Gregory Vlastos, Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies, 42 Classical Philosophy 156-78 
(1947).
104 See TERENCE IRWIN, CLASSICAL THOUGHT (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989).
105 See WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA (1939); TERENCE IRWIN, CLASSICAL THOUGHT (1989).  
106 RICHARD KUHNS, THE HOUSE, THE CITY AND THE JUDGE: THE GROWTH OF MORAL AWARENESS IN THE 
ORESTEIA (1962).
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   Unwritten, not proclaimed, can boast
   A currency that everlastingly is valid;
   An origin beyond the birth of man.
   And I, whom no man’s frown can frighten,
   Am far from risking Heaven’s favor by flouting these.107
This lyric expression of the higher, heavenly law speaks to its pre-historic origin, its 
eternal applicability and its binding position of ascendancy over even king-made law in a 
monarchy.  
Along similar lines, Heraclitus wrote that human laws are nourished by one divine 
law that outlasts them all—the higher law. 108  Heraclitus seeks an enlargement of the rule 
of law beyond the city-state into a form of cosmic justice (as the poet Hesiod suggests).109
Heraclitus also sees a harmony of opposites grounded in natural law (somewhat similar to 
the concept of yin and yang in some Asian philosophies), and calls it Logos110.  At times, 
Heraclitus actually seems to identify Logos with the divine.  A kind of cosmic justice, a 
moral ecology so to say, is thus rooted in the Logos Reality.111  This truth is foundational 
to an international jurisprudence especially, but also to domestic ones. 
The Sophists, on the other hand, put a position often held forth today: rhetoric 
shapes the appearance, which is what is perceived, which has no grounding in justice, 
higher law and virtue.  Such a stance can lead to the position, attributed to Thrasymachus, 
that justice amounts to (crudely enough) the advantage of the more powerful, making it 
relative merely to whoever wields the power (a positivist position that antedates Hans 
107 OEDIPUS PLAYS, supra note 61 at 179.
108 See, e.g., J.M. ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY (Houghton Mifflin, 1968); 
THE PRE-SOCRATICS (ed. Philip Wheelwright, Odyssey, 1966).
109 See JONATHAN BARNES, THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
110
 See 1 W.K.C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 419-34  (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962), for 
an elaboration on the notion of Logos.
111
 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 107; THE PRE-SOCRATICS supra note 107.
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Kelsen by many centuries).112  No cosmology, no knowledge of a Divine Being, and no 
cosmic justice enter into this brutish113 and potentially brutal position.114  For if justice 
amounts only to the dictates of the powerful, oppression can, strangely enough, become 
"justice" according to Thrasymachus.  
The Sophists present the specter of legal positivism and formalism that would 
preclude: "The Moment of Truth for a practicing attorney occurs whenever a prospective 
client tells a story that seems morally compelling but legally hopeless...Too much 
injustice persists in the world because tired legal thinking has accepted unjust patterns as 
inevitable."115
It fell then to the great Socrates to recall Athens to the quest for true knowledge 
and justice, rather than settling for the superficial appearances and conventions of the 
Sophist “spin-doctors.”  He thereby enabled Plato to readdress the deep conditions of the 
human soul, and in doing so to bring into focus the idea of a structure of justice in the 
universe and its transcendent Source, notions desperately needed in law, including 
international law, whether in the West or East. 
An Account of Socrates:
At the trial where his life hung in the balance, Socrates responded to the charge of 
corrupting the Athenian youth with these grand words: 
I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for 
your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest 
improvement of the soul . . . I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from 
virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private.  This is my 
112 REPUBLIC supra note 120.
113
 We would have the Hobbesian condition of “the life of man, solitary, [poor], nasty, brutish, and short” 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 112 (New York, E.P. Dutton, Co., 1950). 
114
 See THE PRE-SOCRATICS supra note 107 at 239-50.
115 ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 5 at 289.
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teaching, and if this is the doctrine that corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person . . . 
I sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself and seek virtue 
and wisdom before he looks to his private interests116 . . . .The difficulty, my friends, is
not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness.
And will life be worth living, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved 
by justice and depraved by injustice?117
Socrates both describes and exemplifies a laudable life, one that surely rose to 
supranormal118 proportions.  Professor Anthony D'Amato wrote that "to Socrates, and 
presumably to the Athenian citizenry as a whole, judging from the evidence which exists, 
a trial and judgment was simply an attempt by the tribunal to apply 'the law,' an 
immutable concept which somehow had a separate, independent existence unchanged by 
specific cases."119  Herein lies another statement of the higher law, which every epoch, 
including the 21st century, ought to follow.  Here is a noble example of magnanimity in 
the face of manifest injustice.
Although Socrates himself faced an adverse (indeed life-threatening) situation, he 
believed that in the ultimate scheme of things, nothing ultimately detrimental could 
happen to the good person.  Augustine expresses similar notions in works such as the 
magisterial De Civitatis Dei, which many consider his magnum opus.120  While this 
sacrificial speech extolling justice and virtue was the crowning achievement of Socrates’ 
life, it is also a fitting introduction to Socrates' student Plato and his contribution to this 
topic.
116 PLATO, APOLOGY 30, 36, 39 (trans. Jowett Random House 1937).
117
 See, e.g., Id. at 49; PLATO, PLATO’S CRITO 47 (ed. Gilbert P. Rose, 3d ed., 1983)(1980). 
118 At the very least in the statistical, social/psychological sense but more importantly in the sublime, moral 
sense.  A chapter in the Sociological Perspective by Dr. Zondra Lindblade draws the distinctions between 
various variations of the term "normal" in her fine chapter of that book.
119ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 119, quoted in ANTHONY D'AMATO, 
OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW: A STUDY OF THE DEATH OF SOCRATES 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079 (1976).
120 Passim, AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, (Trans. Marcus Dods, New York, Hafner, 1945).
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Plato:
Many of Plato’s dialogues concern the virtues, especially those like justice, 
wisdom, and prudence.  Like many of the Asian philosophers, his political writings 
(Republic, Statesman, Laws) likewise address the improvement of the soul.121
The guardians in the Republic, were “to live together in the continual practice of 
virtue, which was to be their sole pursuit.”122    Do most politicians, attorneys, judges and 
other national leaders actually believe that “The art of politics has to do with the soul: 
what gymnastics and medicine are to the body, legislation and the administration of 
justice are to the soul.”?123  Thankfully, such statements are still contemplated by those 
who take seriously a jurisprudence of justice, higher law, and virtue.  It hardly fits, 
however, the mold of a demagogue who runs roughshod over his own people.
Plato even criticized the renown Pericles, saying that Pericles should have sought 
“to implant justice in their souls and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take 
away intemperance, to implant virtue and take away every vice.”124  Plato’s central thesis 
remains the same throughout: the most important task in this life is the improvement of 
the soul through virtue,125 which fits with the higher law.  It is not a mere, surface 
behaviorism.  It is more akin to Yale Dean Harold Koh's notion of internalization.126
Would that his central thesis find more widespread and profounder application in 
international law as well as domestic law!  
121 PLATO, LAWS (trans. Thomas L. Pangle, New York, Basic Books, 1980); PLATO, REPUBLIC (ed. G.R.F. 
Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith, 2000); PLATO, STATESMAN (ed. Julia Annas & Robin Waterfield, New York, 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
122PLATO, TIMAEUS 18 (trans. Donald J. Zeyl, Indianapolis, Hackett Pub. Co., 2000). 
123PLATO, GORGIAS 464 (trans. Walter Hamilton, New York, Penguin Books, 1971).
124Id at 504, 513-14. 
125 REPUBLIC supra note 120 at 338-52.
126
 Koh, supra note 8. 
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The Sophists are akin to the public’s perception of the legal profession and Plato 
roundly criticizes the Sophists’ use of rhetoric as solely a way to win wealth or power, 
rather than to instill virtue.127  Plato shows the problems with Thrasymachus’s definition 
of justice as whatever benefits the stronger: it assumes that the strong really apprehend 
what is best, and thus, that they are wiser than the weak;128 it moves towards anarchy if 
people are constantly and illegitimately vying with each other for power and dominance; 
it leads to ignoring justice and even defending injustice as the better way to life.129 These 
criticisms actually apply to misguided relativism as applied to law and in general: it 
opens the door to ill- conceived self-interest; it threatens what Thomas Hobbes 
subsequently referred to as “. . . [war] of every man against every man, this also is 
consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and 
Injustice have there no place [sic]”130; and furthermore, it can make no binding, just 
distinction between good and evil, just and unjust.  If what Gandhi called soul force does 
not prevail, then other force—be it military, governmental and legal--often does.131
International law generally depends more on its stake in justice and higher law than the 
march of troops to enforce their orders.  It usually must win voluntary acceptance of its 
jurisdiction and good-faith compliance with its orders.  Thus, justice, higher law and 
virtue gain greater significance in the international law context.
In the Phaedrus, Plato expresses concern about sophistical rhetoric132 that seems 
hauntingly applicable to what passes as law and international law at times.  According to 
127 REPUBLIC supra note 120.
128 Id. 
129 HOBBES, supra note 112 at 105.
130
 Dr. Samuel Ling, Asian History Lecture, (Spring 1996).
131 HOBBES, supra note 112 at 105.
132PLATO, PHAEDRAS, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 169-72, 177-79 (trans. B. Jowett, M.A., 4th ed., 
London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953)(1871).
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this view, the orator need only understand the beliefs of his judges, who judge him on the 
art of persuasion, not on the truth of the matter.133  The orator can extol evil as being 
good, and might persuade the public as well to do evil instead of good.134  He influences 
their souls, but without true knowledge.135 To what end does he sway others—merely 
self-interested ones?  Such criticisms must be taken seriously if legal and political 
discourse is to rise above sophistry.  This position does not, however, exclude prudential 
uses of rhetorical (yet honest) tools harnessed to just causes in accordance with higher 
law and justice:  there exists an important distinction between these two positions.
When distilled down, the one of the issues is between opinion and knowledge 
(which must be true by proper definition), between appearance and reality.  When 
Protagoras expresses the opinion that “man is the measure of all things,” he, if logically 
pushed to its limits, affirms all opinions, including the opinion that his own opinion is 
false.136  So even Protagoras must admit that at least one opinion is wiser and truer than 
another; but this deduction makes the wiser ones into the measure of things, not ‘man’ in 
general, and not unequivocally everyone.  Manifestly then, not all opinions are equally 
valuable, wise or worthwhile.137  So there must be some anchor of virtue (such as the 
related set of honesty, veracity and integrity as contrasted by the contrasting set of 
mendaciousness, duplicity and falseness), justice and higher law by which to ground such 
statements.
133 PHAEDRAS supra note 131.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 PLATO, THEAETETUS in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 268-9, 288-290, 304-306, 308 (trans. B. Jowett, 
M.A., 4th ed., London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953)(1871).
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The relativist is deceived into thinking that because the world is continually 
changing in its temporal particularities, that justice, virtue and higher law also mutate.  If 
so, then everything is in a process of becoming: unchanging “being” (permanent, 
essential ontologies) are then abolished.  But because appearances and temporal 
contingencies change, it does not lead one ineluctably to conclude that the underlying 
reality changes too.  
Plato’s famous cave analogy speaks to this point.138  The Sophist relativist is like 
a prisoner who, suffering from a form of amnesia and confined to a world of flitting 
shadows, supposes these appearances to be all the reality there is.139  If he would think, if 
he could look behind himself, if he could exit the cave, he would know very 
differently.140  That is why the Sophist fails: his rhetoric is not liberated by knowledge of 
the truth, but a slave to opinions based on appearances, the convenience of expedience, 
temporal contingencies, prestige, or other factors that vary from place to place and from 
one individual to another.141  Sophistical resistance to justice, other virtues and higher 
law fails; this statement holds for all sophistical opinions—whether by judicial, 
legislative or executive branches.  
Sheer pragmatism or formalism is not enough.  Justice & injustice are not 
changing expedients for changing circumstances; they are rooted in a changeless reality 
indiscernible by the physical senses alone.  So then it is not Socrates but the Sophists who 
impoverished the souls of Athenian youth by failing to extol justice, higher law and 
virtue.  
138 THEAETETUS supra note 135.
139 Id.
140 Id. 
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The Timaeus talks about how God set things in order and constructed the cosmos 
by giving to all things proportion, measure, and harmony.142  According to Plato, this 
cosmic harmony should extend to the law-governed city where justice means the 
harmony of right (just) relationships and proportionate treatment, and also to the good life 
ruled wisely by the virtue graced soul.143  As musical harmony depends on mathematical 
relationships between notes, so human life must be properly ordered if it is not to end in 
painful discord, dissolution or even death.  Indeed Plato declares, “The harmony of the 
soul is virtue.”144 So the discussion again centers on virtue.  Even modicums of virtue can 
help prevent some of the tragedies that legal systems repeatedly endure.  
Plato calls for in the Republic, rule by wise, philosopher-kings rigorously 
educated to disciplined habits aimed at true understanding and continual pursuit of the 
good.145  Such people can help add to the stature of legal systems and the profession.
Plato’s theory of forms as unchanging, transcendent ideals146 becomes relevant 
here.  Reason147 does not develop mere opinions about justice and then apply them in 
governing the appetites.148  The mind does not fabricate virtues, but rather it discovers 
what is objectively and inherently good.149  The goal is to attain to what justice, virtue 
and higher law really are, rather than how they appear to a Thrasymachus or to any other 
person necessarily (although correspondence between a person’s perception and objective 
142 TIMAEUS, supra note 121.
143 Id. 
144 LAWS supra note 120 at 653.
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reality is possible and indeed, sought).  So there exists an objective rooting in real justice, 
virtue and higher law, and a just legal system, by definition, depends on these realities.150
In the Laws, Plato proposes the model of a law-governed community in which the 
people themselves value the good.151  The virtues take precedence over other goods such 
as wealth or beauty.152  Education is geared accordingly and should lead the soul “to hate 
what you ought to hate and love what you ought to love from the beginning of life to the 
end.”153  Indeed, a person’s whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the 
development of virtue: for Plato concludes that ultimately, it is not mere mortals but God 
who ought to be the measure of all things.154
It is important to note that Plato’s conception of knowledge is not just a matter of 
knowledge as against ignorance or opinion, nor just an ability to define or describe a 
virtue.155  Discernment between good and evil is required, along with the practiced 
capacity for making sound judgments that recognize goodness when exemplified in 
particular cases.156  Furthermore, it is not a detached, unemotional kind of thinking, but is 
filled with wonder at and a deep devotion to the good.157  Such a framework exercises 
virtue, pursues justice and comports with higher law.  
150 Many centuries later, scholars such as Aquinas and others built on this foundation. See, e.g. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (1981)(1947).
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Plato employs the analogy of a lover absorbed day and night with his beloved, or 
rather, with the ideals that the beloved exemplifies.158  So then according to Plato, our 
calling in the legal and governmental spheres and in life then, is to romance and be 
romanced by justice, higher law and virtue.  
The Phaedrus likens the soul to a charioteer with two winged horses, one wanton 
and wild, the other spirited but controllable, soaring towards the sun in all its majesty.159
As long as the wanton horse is uncontrolled there can be no united effort, and both horse 
and charioteers plunge down to the earth again and again.160  But if the driver guides the 
spirited horse while giving it the lead, then its strength will control the wanton so that 
they will pull together and soar to the heavens.161  Plato speaks of the higher aspects of 
humans harnessing the appetitive/animal side.162  The brute inside must be disciplined to 
soar to the heavens.163  Otherwise, the host of horrors that parade through this world will 
march on.
Plato, as an encapsulation, states:  “Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth 
and heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is 
possible; and to become like him is to become holy, just, and wise.”164 In other words it is 
an exhortation towards a just and virtuous life under the highest possible law.  This view 
has become all too rare as Western Civilization has reached what Harvard Professor 
Emeritus Harold Berman calls the "twilight of transcendence."165
158 GOULD supra note 154.
159 PHAEDRAS supra note 131.
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Plato continues this same theme in the Laws: “he who would be dear to God must, 
as far as is possible, be like him and such as he is.”166 Several motifs emerge from these 
writings: First, this entire metaphysical discussion grounds itself in unchanging and 
transcendent Fact and Reality—in virtue, justice and higher law.  In this sense, law is a 
fact.167  Second, Plato’s forms theory introduced a theory of universals with unchanging 
natures that dominated the jurisprudence of most of the history of Western Civilization 
and continues to this day.  This is the best foundational theory for international law and 
law in general.
The Statesman likens God to a statesman shepherding his people, but it is in the 
Laws that Plato offers his last and most detailed account.168 Plato describes God as 
powerful, purposeful, intelligent, and good in an outgoing way: everything he designs is 
directed towards the overall goodness of the universe.169  Individual virtue and the just 
city-state are supposed to be parts of this cosmic harmony, and because they imitate 
God’s goodness, they are as microcosms of the whole.170  Each legal system, whether 
international or domestic, can aspire to such lofty objectives.
The chief purpose of the Timaeus seems to be to link justice to the structure of the 
cosmos—higher law.171  This higher law grounds itself in reality, in the forms, in the 
nature of the soul, in cosmic harmony, in the idea of the good, in God.  No better 
theoretical framework exists.
166LAWS, supra note 120 at 716.  See CUTBERT G. RUTENBAR, THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMITATION OF GOD IN 
PLATO (New York, King’s Crown Press, 1946) (1909).
167 See Anthony D'Amato's treatment in Anthony D’Amato, On the Connection Between Law and Justice, 
26 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (1993).
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As a contrast to secularized individualism, skepticism and relativism that prevails 
in this legal culture, Plato tells us:  “The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a 
view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has 
an action and passion appropriate to it…one of these portions of the universe is thine 
own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole, and in order that the 
life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and 
not the whole for the sake of you."172 Hence, Plato thinks the good is ultimately found in 
a more wholistic and community context, and ultimately, in the mind of God.  If law does 
not contribute in this way, it loses an important portion of its raison d'etre. 
In their thinking about the cosmos, the early Greek philosophers struggled to 
distinguish between appearances and reality.  Plato and Aristotle extended this concern 
into the metaphysical domain where what appears to some to be the good may not in 
reality be so.173  Pleasure, wealth, power, or success may be sought after because to their 
devotees they appear to be the highest ends, but in reality they are not.  This confusion 
between appearance and reality in ethics underlies the contest between two dominant 
images of human life that Alasdair MacIntyre finds in a post-Homeric reflection, a life 
aiming at virtue or excellence (arete) and a life aiming at superficial “success” or 
power.174  Every branch of government would do well to pursue the former rather than 
the latter.
The former image of virtue/excellence (arete) is found in Plato and Aristotle, the 
latter (superficial success/power) in Aristotle’s one-time student (interestingly enough), 
172 LAWS supra note 120 at 903.
173 Id. 
174 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 88 (1988).
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Alexander the Great.175 Neither power nor success, nor pleasure, nor wealth is in reality 
the highest good, even though to some people they appear so.  It is not denying that they 
are goods in their proper places when attached as means in the service of virtuous ends.  
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with the improvement of the 
soul and developed an ethic of virtue grounded in the ordered nature of reality as a 
whole.176  Those in or influential to legal systems would be well advised to follow such 
an approach rather than making positivistic or formalistic excuses for injustice, vice or 
violations of higher law.  To Plato’s student Aristotle we turn next for further grounding 
in justice, higher law and virtue, the best basis for international law particularly but also 
law as whole.
Aristotle:  Justice, Telos, Virtue and the Higher Life through Higher Law
Aristotle merges the notion of justice with virtue by crowning justice as the 
apogee of virtue in relation to others:
Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely 
that it is displayed towards others.  This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of 
the virtues, and more sublime 'than the evening or the morning star'; and we have the 
proverb—
In Justice is all Virtue found in sum.
And Justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and perfect in a 
special degree, because its possessor can practice his virtue towards others and not 
merely by himself; for there are many who can practice virtue in their own private affairs 
but cannot do so in their relations with another.  This is why we approve the saying of 
Bias, 'Office will show a man'; for in office one is brought into relation with others and 
becomes a member of a community.
The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, 
accounts for the view that Justice alone of the virtues is 'the good of others,' because it 
does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate.  As then the worst 
man is he who practices vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the 
best is not he who practices virtue in regard to himself but he who practices it towards 
others; for that is a difficult task . . . 177
175 WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? supra note 173.
176 See Finnis supra note 5 at Ch. XIII, which analyzes and synthesizes important strands of thought of 
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Aristotle does not stop with justice as perfect virtue in human relationships alone.  
In addition, there are hints of the relation between human virtue, higher law, justice and 
the divine.178  Being is not morally neutral; in fact, the world of particulars is laden with 
issues of justice through and through,179 including matters in the international law domain 
as well as domestic law spheres.
Aristotle states:  “If God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, 
this compels our wonder: and if in a better state this compels it yet more.  And God is in a 
better state.  And life belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that 
actuality…We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and 
duration continuous and eternal belong to God;”180
The just and virtuous--the human telos181--is the full development of all this 
potential.182  This is our highest good.  It is eudaimonia, usually translated "happiness" 
but actually closer to “well-being,” although “well” simply reiterates “good” (“being” 
itself being good).  Aristotle elaborates: the human good is the activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue (arete).183  Such activity never violates and always harmonizes 
with higher law.
178 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS supra note 176.
179 Id. 
180 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 994b.12 (Trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle, Indiana Univ. Press, 1966).; See 
also XII. 6-7; ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, VIII (Trans. Robin Waterfield, 1996).
181
 Greek for "end" or "purpose".  "God and nature," writes Aristotle, "create nothing that has not its use"  
ARISTOTLE, ON THE HEAVENS, 271A.33 (trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Cambridge, Harv. Univ. Press, 1945);  
"Nature never makes anything without a purpose"  ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL, 432b.21(Cambridge, Harv. 
Univ. Press, 2000)(1957).
182 Dunamis in the Greek.
183 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS supra note 176 at I.4; See also JOHN COOPER, REASON AND THE HUMAN GOOD 
IN ARISTOTLE ch. 1 (1975).
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Moral virtues are the excellence of the appetitive life, whereas intellectual virtues 
indicate excellence in the life of the mind.184 Such human flourishing is compromised, 
according to Aristotle, in those who live for pleasure, wealth or honor, for other animals 
have such appetites too; only humans have the power to reason (broadly defined, 
including the healthy functioning of the conscience) and so to guide those appetites.185
The human telos does not exclude pleasure or other such satisfactions: indeed, achieving 
the good brings its own pleasure.186  No other species have courts, legislatures, or 
executive branches—or the deliberative processes found in legal, political, and academic 
discussions.
Actualizing such a life is a developmental process:  the Maker grants the capacity, 
but to develop it requires just habits, and just habits require just choices repeatedly made 
and reinforced until they become second nature.187  Just choices in turn must be 
determined by practical reason deliberating about what accords with higher law.  The 
various appetites, as well as pleasure and pain in general, may be felt both too much and 
too little, and neither side of the spectrum from the balanced center is good.188  But to feel 
them, at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with 
the right motive and in the just way, mediates between these extremes and characterizes 
virtue.189  Herein we find Aristotle’s famous Golden Mean between extremes.190
So what are the implications for jurisprudence, the state and for laws?  The “best 
kind of state exists not just to provide external goods but for the good of the soul—in 
184 METAPHYSICS supra note 179.
185 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS supra note 176 at 1099a.31-1099b.8.
186 Id.
187 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS supra note 176 at 1099a.31-1099b.8.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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effect, to make men good…the state therefore inculcates right habits by means of just 
laws."191   Aristotle also states "for the administration of the law means the discrimination 
of what is just and what is unjust."192 This venerable sage continues: "This is why we do 
not permit a man to rule but the law, because a man rules in his own interest, and 
becomes a tyrant; but the function of a ruler is to be the guardian of justice, and if of 
justice, then of equality."193  All in society, especially those distinctly responsible as 
leaders of the legal and political realms, should help further such ends that abide by the 
rule of law, nourished by higher law through justice. 
Henry Veatch, an Aristotle scholar, tells us that the most important end of 
knowledge is not knowledge of humankind, because humans are not the most important 
entities in the universe.194  So according to Aristotle, the very nature of our being points 
us beyond ourselves:  humans are not the measure of all things, for only God is perfectly 
good.195  In reality, the human telos, our highest end, is God.196  Pursuing justice, virtue 
and higher law created by the Uncreated197 then justly becomes the virtuous pursuit of 
every state and every legal system, most vividly in the international sphere, but also in 
domestic realms.   
Conclusion
In any legal system, but most notably in international legal systems, this 
foundation of higher law, virtue and justice alone will sustain long-term flourishing and 
191 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, I.1-2, VII.1-3 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988).
192 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 176.
193 Id.
194 HENRY VEATCH, ARISTOTLE: A CONTEMPORARY APPRECIATION (1974).
195 Id. 
196 Id.
197
 As Dostoevsky indicated, if God is dead, then everything is permissible see FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE 
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (ed. Ralph E. Matlaw, trans. Garnett, 1976). See also, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (trans. Constance Garnett, 1938).
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fulfillment, both individually and societally.  It points the way towards progress and 
needed reform of positive law.  The accumulated weight of wise words over the centuries 
from both the East and the West198 exhort us in this direction.  It is a safeguard against 
such monstrosities as Nazi, Maoist and Stalinist oppression, and a beacon to light the way 
into the future of our global village.  
The words of the great 20th century Princeton professor emeritus and 
jurisprudential scholar Edwin Corwin provides a fitting finale to this essay:
There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to 
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude of those 
who wield the physical resources of the community.  Such principles were made by no 
human hands. . . . They are eternal and immutable.  In relation to such principles, human 
laws are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent, merely a record or 
transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power but one of discovery and 
declaration.”199 [italics part of the original text as quoted]
Thus, the pronouncements of every legal system, international especially but also 
domestic, the judgments of every court, the formulations of every legislature, the 
decisions of every executive, should discover,200 declare and follow accordingly: it would 
result in greater worthiness to lead and greater legitimacy for people to follow.  Herein 
lay the seeds of progress201 and reform.
198 See Finnis, supra note 5 at ch. XIII where he deftly handles profound thoughts from Plato, Aristotle and 
Aquinas.
.
199 EDWARD S. CORWIN, supra note 7, at 4-5.
200
 “In contrast, natural lawyers claim that morality is not so much to be defined as to be discovered; reality 
is not created but apprehended” FORTE supra note 15 at 8.
201
 While rejecting the notion of automatic, inexorable “progress”,  the use here nonetheless promises 
progress to the extent justice, higher law, and virtue are embraced. 
